The failure of Venezuela's elites

 

Elites are the driving force behind decision-making[1]. Power is the tool they use to manage state resources, and the population acts as the source of legitimacy (in democracies) or as the workforce and support (in autocracies), always maintaining a structural command-obedience gap that is only altered when the elite loses its operational capacity.

Since Spanish colonial times, Venezuelan elites have undergone constant and mostly traumatic transformations, leaving no room for an oligarchy like other societies in Latin America. The rise and fall of surnames and the instability of the productive process, always dependent on the external sector, have prevented the components of the elites from remaining the same. That is a reality that persists. There has only been one successful elite, and that is the one that was in power between 1928 and 1973, regardless of the form of government. These elites had a lubricant: oil revenues. Oil revenues. And with that, which is no easy feat, they managed, through republican, democratic, modernizing institutional development, to transform Venezuelan society from a rural population left to fend for itself into a modern middle-class society. After 1973, the elites lost themselves in greed and began a process of self-destruction that led to Chavismo. It expanded thanks to the massification of public education and social mobility. Chavismo was a violent expression or clear desire to replace the elites, and it can be said that they partially succeeded. However, the predatory patrimonialist pattern that gained strength after 1973 remained with them.

This led to the obvious failure not only of his project but of Venezuelan society as a whole. The division caused by incompatible visions of the future between the elite, who refused to abandon the idea of democracy, and the Chavistas led to a persistent crisis that has lasted since 2001. Even so, Chavismo prevailed with its zero-sum vision, despite the fact that society in general, beyond the elites, decided to bet on democracy, the republic, and freedoms under the leadership of an old representative of the pre-Chavista elites, María Corina Machado.

Trump is right when he says that Machado does not have support within the country, but Trump, part of the American elite, does not think in terms of democracy but in terms of the elite. Machado does not have the support of the old elites. Nor does she have the support of the Chavista elites or their mutations, because although both differ in terms of their method of government, both are clear about the depredation of society as a way of life. María Corina Machado represents a break with both the old elite she comes from and the new one. Hence, she does not have the support of the Venezuelan elites, but she does have the popular vote. Without the support of the elites, including the military high command, she cannot govern.

Yes. Trump is right, and that is the basis for his intervention strategy.

Beyond the White House's geopolitical motives, American intervention is based on stabilizing a region that is key to its security interests, including four countries: Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Mexico. Since the conquest, the viceregal territory now known as Colombia (which included Panama) was best accessed from Venezuelan territory. Venezuelan territory can also be controlled from Colombian territory. If one falls, the other falls. They form part of a well-defined, albeit poorly integrated, geopolitical whole. This was understood by the Spanish rulers and later by Miranda and Bolívar. Trump is no different in this perception. He needs to remove the Chinese, Russians, Iranians, and all Eurasian powers from that region. So he started where the link is weakest and easiest to break: the Chavista regime.

Trump captured an entire regime by kidnapping its leader and using violence against it, which the regime, still in existence, cannot defend itself against. Trump decided to use this regime, which is nothing more than a mutation of the elites led by the Rodríguez brothers (a synthesis of the 1973-1999 process mentioned above), to secure the area. That is why it is the old and new elites (where the old also mix with the new Chavistas) who mourn the intervention the most, and not Venezuelan society.

When you tell a random fruit seller that they have taken away his oil, he will surely look at you with scorn. He has never effectively and productively seen a dollar from that oil revenue. Before Maduro's disaster, he may have seen something, but since 2012, those petrodollars no longer circulate in the country as they once did. They were appropriated by that mutation of the old and new elites that is the front man system, of which the Rodríguez brothers were already one of the leaders and are now the most important after the fall of Madurato. The Rodrigato, then, is being used by Trump as a bacterial solution to dismantle a dominance that is not functional for his interests or for those of Venezuelan society.

Every member of the Venezuelan elite knows, feels, and is pained by this failure in their eternal goal of dominating Venezuelan society and, in the case of both the old and new elites, exploiting it. Trump, at missile point, subjugates them and tells them they have to stabilize the dollar, not steal the petro-income, invest properly, “make Venezuela great again,” which is nothing more than a byproduct of the American's main interest, which is to ensure control of the region with all its resources.

Thus, amid the tearful failure of the Venezuelan elites, there is a coincidence between Trump's interests and those of the Venezuelan people. For now.

Will it last? Will it succeed? It will depend on how effectively “Rodrigato,” who also has his own plans to deceive Trump, can hold out until Trump's potential defeat in November to implement the reforms indicated by Washington. If Trump, who already has several fronts open on a global and domestic scale, is unsuccessful, then we will see the old and new elites call for nationalism and reclaim their traditional predatory preeminence over Venezuelan society. If Venezuelans experience an improvement with the intervention, it is very likely that María Corina Machado will continue to lead the breakaway, even with Trump's downfall. If Venezuelans do not experience improvement, they will not grudgingly bow to the “nationalist” demands of the predatory elites but will instead reorganize either the struggle or another escape.

We know that Rubio has a lot at stake here. Trump's plan is truly clear and will leave its mark. Even if he loses, he may remain in power and have staying power, but what matters is that the intervention involving American oil companies, without the Venezuelan elites having any decision-making power, is successful in bringing about a substantial change in the balance of power within Venezuela and the arrival of a new republican elite that is forged with or without the leadership of María Corina Machado. In short, Trump's success could be the success of Venezuelan society and the burial of a predatory dual elite (old and Chavista), paving the way for a new generation that is modernizing, capitalist, republican, integrative, and non-predatory.

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[1] According to different ideas in the humanities, elites are defined as a small group of people who have a lot of power and control over important resources and decisions. This makes them dominant over the rest of the population, and different ideas can be used to explain this. Gaetano Mosca says that this power does not come from force alone, but from a better way of organising society. This lets the minority force its ideas on the majority through a "political formula" that makes the minority's control seem legitimate to the people it governs. This idea is also supported by Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy," which says that in every complex organisation, a small group of leaders will eventually take control and their own interests will come before those of the group. But the balance of power is always changing, following a pattern described by Vilfredo Pareto as the "Circulation of Elites". This pattern shows how different groups of elites take turns rising to power, with one group being replaced by a new one. This replacement can happen through the natural process of talent being recognised or through a sudden, radical change. Finally, within the framework of modern democracies, authors such as Joseph Schumpeter propose that the population does not exercise government directly, but rather that its function is reduced to a competition for votes, where citizens periodically choose which group of rival elites will hold the legitimate right to rule. Venezuelans seek organization without abandoning their aspiration to be elites (social advancement) through democratic competition.