Colombia and Petro's political-energy chaos

 

Petro is balancing between trying to negotiate with “Santismo” and a section of some of the parties prone to the corruption of the "mermelada" to gain control of important bodies such as the Procuraduría and thus influence the renewal of the Constitutional Court and other bodies that could be key to his political future, which does not look good surrounded by many corruption scandals, and mobilising his electoral base and related social movements, victimising himself before the alleged existence of a "coup" or an "assassination attempt" (a classic move of Latin American authoritarian rulers). If this were the only problem in Colombia, all would be relatively well, but the situation is not good and serious crises are still looming with a Petro lost in his political-emotional labyrinth. These crises are: 1) electricity, 2) social conflict that threatens food security, 3) the failure of total peace.

On the energy front, Colombia faces the possibility of electricity rationing in the summer of 2025-2026 due to a projected decline in reservoir levels, which could fall to 12%, a historically low rate. Nearly 70% of Colombia's electricity comes from hydroelectric power, and the drought complicates the future of supply as Petro makes no progress. This imbalance has been exacerbated by the occurrence of the El Niño phenomenon, which has historically exacerbated drought conditions in the country, increasing the risks to the electricity system. The occurrence of the El Niño phenomenon leads to significant releases from reservoirs, reaching a reduction of up to 47% during the summer season, a much higher percentage than in previous climatic phenomena. This would result in reservoir levels at the end of the season approaching 25.3%, a level never seen in the last 30 years of operation. In addition, the pressurised hydro capacity would place high demands on thermal plants, reaching average values of up to 92 gigawatt-hours per day in the summer of 2025-2026. This level of demand would put unprecedented pressure on the infrastructure, further complicating the stability of the energy supply. The 7.5% increase in energy consumption in Colombia between March this year and the same month last year, mainly due to high temperatures caused by the El Niño phenomenon, highlights the challenges facing the country's electricity sector. The growing demand for energy and the heavy reliance on water resources for electricity generation highlight the vulnerability of the system. La Niña will arrive in the fourth quarter of this year and may bring rain. That is the hope, but with climate change, little is known.

At the same time, there are trade union crises linked to the energy cost structure, which can lead to conflicts with major logistical implications. The reality is that other conflicts with serious logistical implications will follow the transport strike. For example, according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, during the last transport strike the total food supply in Colombia fell by 49.4% between 29 August and 5 September. Cities such as Tunja and Cúcuta experienced even more dramatic drops in supply of 87% and 82.1% respectively. This could be repeated and, if it continues, could have the same effect as the Petro-led strikes under the Duque government.

Finally, Maduro's fraud and Morena's consolidation of power in Mexico have boosted both the drug business and the stability of criminal groups in Colombia. Petro's total peace is therefore in jeopardy. According to an internal report by the Presidency of the Republic, the public order situation in Colombia is complicated by the presence of armed groups in 30 departments. The government is making progress in six approaches with different structures or negotiation tables, but it is failing in the case of the ELN and the FARC dissident groups, which are the most important. Maduro's deception strengthens the possibilities for these groups to expand. They are in no hurry to negotiate peace. Petro's neglect of law enforcement also helps. The impact of the failure to achieve total peace and increased insecurity will hinder any possibility of improving the country's energy security beyond Petro's almost infantile sustainability policy.

Consequences for Petro?

These three crises will ultimately undermine Petro's political options for the congress. The marches he called for last week did nothing to lift the spirits of his supporters. Demanding, without encouragement. Petro has lost what he would call "the people" and this is being sensed by the political class, which is beginning to think of an intermediate scenario that will allow it to take advantage of those left-wing bases and the rest of the discontented in polarised alliances that are trying to take off to the left of Petro and others that are trying to put forward a centre-right option without the still toxic Uribism. Petro has the advantage that the opposition and political alternatives are still fragmented, but whoever he promotes as his successor will not be the most popular. Other options, still in the air, have yet to consolidate.