When Other Eurasian Powers Become Interested in Latin America

 

Various Eurasian powers are deploying their simplest strategies to connect with Latin America's mining and agri-food potential. There is Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, but the one that stands out most now is India.

India has been actively engaged in talks with countries in Latin America (including Africa) to secure critical mineral blocks essential for clean energy technologies (electric vehicles, wind turbines, and power grids), especially lithium, while continuing to pursue oil for energy security reasons.

In January, India signed a $24 million agreement for lithium exploration in Argentina. This is part of a broader strategy in which India aims to acquire mineral blocks on a government-to-government or priority basis from resource-rich countries in these regions. In any case, India's Ministry of Mines is also prioritizing the exploration of critical minerals domestically. It recently auctioned its first lithium block in Chhattisgarh, and more exploration is expected soon. These efforts are driven by the growing global demand for critical minerals needed for the clean energy transition. By securing these resources, India aims to strengthen its clean energy infrastructure and reduce import dependency by competing with China, the US and the EU.

India is establishing various types of contacts in the oil and agro-industrial sectors, focusing on Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, and approaching Colombia and Ecuador. In this context, they are taking advantage of Mercosur's weaknesses, such as the current dissonance between Lula and Milei (previously between Fernández and Bolsonaro), as well as the low level of integration as a bloc among the countries of the region.

India has the advantage of not having the ideological profile of China and does not pose a threat to the geopolitical stability of the region and to American influence in the future if Trump arrives. Perhaps this is true for China, which is making progress in infrastructure development and could put pressure on key governments such as Peru, Panama or Brazil to prevent them from easily exporting to India. Something similar can be exploited by Arab countries, which enjoy the influence of Syrian-Lebanese or Palestinian backgrounds among Latin American elites. In the same context, Israel has a long way to go, but its relations are more developed and diversified and do not require large quantities to produce. They only develop software and financial relationships that leverage any business.

The weakness of Mercosur affects not only the countries of the region, but also the West. The Eurasian powers have more room for maneuver and autonomy than the European powers, and a trade agreement with Mercosur, for example, would help them a lot in this regard, but the European Union is slow to respond if it had so much to choose from. The Eurasians can negotiate and compete much better on their own. In the end, Latin American export sectors also benefit. Especially in times of the Chinese/American struggle.

While China, for example, would benefit from both versions, it is also true that it would benefit from a little more stability. So, a prosperous and peaceful Latin America is the best scenario for everyone. This is not so important for powers like Russia or Iran, which have their own wars and other issues, but in general, whether China, the Arabs or the Indians do not care whether there is democracy or not, what is important is that there is stability in the ports and in the governments, as well as respect for the rules of business that will allow them to consolidate their supply chains. In that sense, this is a concern that competes with the United States and Europe.

India and the Arabs, no matter how sophisticated their strategy, are simply moving forward with direct agreements and preparing to use the same ports that the Chinese are building or financing. The Chinese and Americans are not alone in the struggle for resources in the region.